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## The American Historical Review

### THE REHABILITATION OF THERAMENES

IT is safe to say that no Athenian statesman and patriot, not excepting even Themistocles, has been so persistently misjudged by modern writers of Greek history, and especially by makers of school manuals of Greek history, as Theramenes. And yet the testimonies of his contemporaries are either negatively favorable, as in the case of Thucydides, or harmlessly and jocosely unfavorable, as in the case of Aristophanes, or wavering—now favorable and now unfavorable, as in the case of Xenophon, and only consistently and bitterly hostile in the case of Lysias; while the secondary testimonies of Ephorus (as seen in Diodorus) and Aristotle are frankly and wholly eulogistic, and, among Roman men of letters, Cicero ranks him with Themistocles and Pericles, and Julius Cæsar with Cicero and Pericles. But the malignant and perverted estimate of him by Lysias prevails in later scholia, and either prevails or has undue influence in all the current histories of Greece since Mitford, large and small, excepting only those of Beloch and Bury. These scholars adopt in the main the eloquent and discriminating tribute to Theramenes which came to light with Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens* in 1890.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, Aristotle may well be called the ancient vindicator of Theramenes, and our judgment of those modern writers who misjudged Theramenes before the vindication of him by Aristotle saw the light again must be much more lenient than of

<sup>1</sup> Even before the reappearance of Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens*, the rare dissent from the unfavorable estimate of Theramenes prevailing among modern writers had culminated in a full and able vindication of him by Pöhlig, in Fleckeisen's *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie*, Supplementband IX. (1877-1878), 227-320, the main positions of which were cordially adopted by Beloch in his *Attische Politik seit Perikles* (1884). Pöhlig's monograph, together with the bibliographical note in Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*, Band III., Teil II., 1463, shows the course of modern opinion during the last century.

those who, like Abbott, Eduard Meyer, and Busolt, still strive, more or less, against this new evidence.<sup>1</sup>

There are four great events in which Theramenes was more or less prominent as a leader, and by his conduct in them he is to be judged. These are, first, the revolution of the Four Hundred (411 B. C.) ; second, the restoration of Athenian supremacy in the Ægean sea (410-407) ; third, the battle of the Arginusæ (406) ; and fourth, the establishment of the Thirty in Athens (404-403). It is the purpose of this paper to weigh anew the ancient testimonies to the part of Theramenes in these four events.

I. *The Revolution of the Four Hundred.*<sup>2</sup> In the terror inspired by the Sicilian disaster all parties at Athens united in recognizing certain imperative needs. These were, as Thucydides clearly states,<sup>3</sup> a new fleet, retention of the allies (especially Eubœa), economy in domestic expenditures, and a small body of selected elders to initiate legislation. "While their fright lasted", says Thucydides,<sup>4</sup> "they were ready to correct every abuse, after the manner of a democracy". A limited democracy, then, with financial reforms, was the happy mean on which all parties at Athens united in this great crisis, while there was still a faint hope that all might not be lost. To this political programme, through all the troublous years that followed, Theramenes was persistently true to the end of his life, and he gave his life in defense of it. In the darkest moments of the struggle the extreme oligarchs, who wanted oligarchy even at the price of submission to Sparta, would get the upper hand ; in the all too fleeting times of triumph the extreme democrats, who wanted every Athenian citizen without exception to be paid something from the uncertain revenues of the state, would get the upper hand. In the darkest and the brightest times alike Theramenes is found insisting on the two cardinal principles of the frightened democracy—a limited democracy and financial reforms, *i. e.*, a suf-

<sup>1</sup> All three writers interpret too much hostility to Theramenes into the testimony of Thucydides, and give too little weight to the emphatic praise bestowed upon him by Aristotle. The spirit of the testimony of Thucydides is far more closely akin to that of Aristotle than to that of Lysias. And the hostile insinuations which the partizan Xenophon puts into his narrative of the conduct of Theramenes are more than counterbalanced by the eloquent defense of that conduct which the man Xenophon puts into the mouth of Theramenes. In the conflict of ancient testimonies, then, it is not Thucydides, Lysias, and Xenophon against Ephorus and Aristotle, but Lysias against all the rest.

<sup>2</sup> The ancient authorities are Thucydides, viii. 47-98, especially 68, 89, 92, 97 ; Lysias, *contra Eratosthenem*, 64-67 ; Diodorus (Ephorus), xiii. 36-38 ; and Aristotle, *Athenaion Politeia*, 28-33. Justin, v. 3 may be disregarded, except for a phrase or two echoing Ephorus : "Itaque permittente populo imperium ad senatum transfertur" ; "optimates terribi primo urbem prodere Lacedæmoniis temptavere."

<sup>3</sup> viii. 1, § 3.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, § 4, Jowett's translation, as, in the main, in the following citations.

frage restricted to those able to serve the state with arms and money, and no payment of public funds except for military service.

By 411 B. C. the outlook for Athenian empire in the Ægean sea was desperate. Syracuse, Sparta, and Persia were in league together, and commanded generous moneys; while the Spartan occupation of Decelea, the revolt of powerful allies (including the Ionian cities of the mainland), and the limitless expenditure of uncertain state revenues for the public services of the beleaguered Athenian citizens made it more and more difficult to maintain an Athenian fleet in the Ægean strong enough to hold in subjection the discontented allies, to say nothing of bringing back to their allegiance and payment of tribute the allies who had revolted. The question then became one of a more or less humiliating peace with Sparta, or a more or less humiliating continuance of the war with her by means of Persian subsidies. In either case a modification of the extreme democratic or, rather, socialistic form of government was imperative, and those who strove for such a modification no more deserve the name of "conspirators", comprising as they did the intellectual and social leaders of the day, than do those who in recent years of our own times have joined in citizens' crusades against parties intrenched in city government. The democracy of Pericles, which had never since his death been subject to proper guidance and control, had had its day and failed. It even acquiesced, so far as the citizen body remaining at home was concerned, in such a modification of the democratic polity as would secure—so its advocates honestly believed—the financial aid of Persia and the leadership of the one man whom most Athenians now regarded as preëminently capable of leadership—Alcibiades. With this movement went the ten *Probouloi* whom the democracy itself had elected after the Sicilian disaster. Among these was Hagnon, the father of Theramenes.<sup>1</sup>

But when the reactionary movement had been pushed too far by the extreme oligarchs under the uncompromising lead of the masterful Antiphon; when the army at Samos had shaken itself free from its oligarchic leaders and pronounced in favor of a modified democracy instead of the extreme oligarchy of the Four Hundred; and when, above all, the shifty Alcibiades had won and assumed the leadership of this indignant military democracy at Samos, then Theramenes headed a movement which should unite the moderate oligarchs at Athens with the moderate military democrats at Samos, and under the lead of Alcibiades. He did not abandon the cause in which he had embarked at first; he carried it rather to a triumph-

<sup>1</sup> Aristotle, *Athenaion Politeia*, 29, § 2; Lysias, *contra Eratosthenem*, 65.

ant issue, as the demands which Alcibiades sent to the Four Hundred at Athens plainly show. "He had nothing to say", so Thucydides reports his message,<sup>1</sup> "against the rule of the Five Thousand, but the Four Hundred must abdicate, and the old Council of Five Hundred be restored. If they had reduced expenditures at home so that the citizens on military service could be better supported, he highly approved. For the rest he entreated them to stand firm, and not give way to the enemy; if the city was preserved, there was good hope that they might be reconciled amongst themselves, but if once anything happened either to the army at Samos or to their fellow-citizens at home, there would be no one left to be reconciled with."

But when the Athenian people had reluctantly acquiesced in a moderate oligarchical or limited democratic form of government, it was to secure the leadership of Alcibiades, as Thucydides makes plain<sup>2</sup>; and the programme of the oligarchical leaders which finally found favor in the eyes of the people had these two main clauses: (1) that no one who was not on military service ought to receive pay from the state; and (2) that not more than five thousand should have a share in the government—those, namely, who were best able to serve the state in person and with their money.<sup>3</sup> And now the military democracy under the leadership of Alcibiades at Samos formally proffered to the Four Hundred at Athens the very programme with which the Four Hundred had themselves won over the people of Athens, but which they had later abandoned under the influence of the extremists among their number. Is it any wonder that the majority of them, as Thucydides says,<sup>4</sup> were much encouraged, and began to strive together for the attainment of the original purposes of their political agitation? They had been swept far aside from their original purposes by the partizanship of Antiphon; they now gladly returned to them under the lead of such prominent and influential members of their body

as Theramenes the son of Hagnon, Aristocrates the son of Scellius, and others, who had been foremost in the [original] movement, but now, fearing, as they said, the army in Samos and Alcibiades, fearing also lest their colleagues on embassies to Lacedæmon should, unauthorized by the majority, betray the city, they did not indeed formally renounce extreme oligarchy, but insisted that the Five Thousand ought to be established in fact and not in name merely, and that the constitution should be made more equal. This was the political pretext of which they availed themselves, but the majority of them were afflicted with that sort of personal

<sup>1</sup> viii. 86, §§ 6, 7.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 53 *fin.*; 54, § 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 65 *fin.* and 66, § 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 89, § 1.

ambition which is most apt to prove fatal to an oligarchy succeeding a democracy. As soon as an oligarchy is established, all its promoters demand, not equality, but each that he himself be far above his fellows. Whereas in a democracy, when an election is made, a man is less disappointed at a failure because he has not been competing with his equals. The motives which most sensibly affected them were the great power of Alcibiades at Samos, and a belief that the oligarchy was not going to be permanent. Accordingly every one was striving to be the first champion of the people himself.<sup>1</sup>

These are all the words of Thucydides that can in any way be held to contain an unfavorable estimate of the motives of Theramenes; there are none to deprecate his acts.<sup>2</sup> And even here the motives of personal ambition are attributed, not to Theramenes by name, but to "the majority" of his group of the oligarchs, and to oligarchs in general. It may well be that if Thucydides had lived to write of the later martyrdom of Theramenes in a vain attempt to secure for a second time precisely that form of government for which he was now contending, he would have acquitted him of the lower personal ambition with which he here charges "the majority" of his political group. He does at any rate say of the constitution which Theramenes more than all others helped to establish once: "This government during its early days was the best which the Athenians ever enjoyed within my memory. Oligarchy and democracy were duly attempered. And thus after the miserable state into which she had fallen, the city was again able to raise her head."<sup>3</sup>

In any case, to be the first "champion of the people (*προστάτης τοῦ δήμου*)" in a constitutional struggle which secured the best government that people had ever had was a personal ambition for which Theramenes deserves no blame. And that his motives were not wholly selfish is clear from his undeviating loyalty to Alcibiades, a point to be emphasized all through his career. As for the title of

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, viii. 89.

<sup>2</sup> At his first introduction of Theramenes (viii. 68, § 4) as one of the foremost leaders in the revolution, Thucydides briefly characterizes him as a man of great eloquence and ability, one among many sagacious men who accomplished a great task. This is brief praise, it is true, but not so brief as to be dispraise. In very similar language Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.*, 32, § 2, speaks of Pisander, Antiphon, and Theramenes together as "men of good birth, and of high reputation for sagacity and ability"

Whether Thucydides wrote his testimonies to the character and career of Theramenes before or after the death of Theramenes is an open question. It is certainly possible, for aught now known, that he wrote them before that death which forced Xenophon out of partizan antagonism into undisguised admiration and defense. If so, and had he lived to write of the last days of Theramenes, Thucydides might have shown for him a warm admiration, like that felt for Antiphon in viii. 68.

It cannot be granted that Thucydides, in viii. 92, "puts the conduct of Theramenes in a very suspicious light" (Abbott, *History of Greece*, III. 416). Theramenes is there represented as proceeding cautiously and hesitatingly — as one walking over a smoldering volcano, but not treacherously.

<sup>3</sup> viii. 97, § 2.

"champion of the people", which seems to have a scornful implication in the phrase of Thucydides, Aristotle bestows it on Solon, Themistocles, Aristides, and Pericles, as well as on Cleon and Cleophon.

It is unjust, then, to load the memory of Theramenes with any condemnation of his motives or acts by Thucydides. The testimony of Thucydides, as it stands in its uncompleted form, is at least negatively favorable; the scholiast on Aristophanes felt it to be positively so.<sup>1</sup> Had Thucydides lived to complete his testimony, there is reason for thinking that it would have been positively and emphatically favorable, if not eulogistic; for the eulogistic testimony of Aristotle is accompanied by precisely the same estimate of the constitution of Theramenes which Thucydides gives:

The Four Hundred were accordingly deposed and the conduct of affairs entrusted to the Five Thousand of the hoplite class; it was voted also that no public office be salaried. The chief promoters of this change were Aristocrates and Theramenes, who did not approve of the conduct of the Four Hundred, since they usurped all authority and submitted nothing to the Five Thousand. But now, for a while, Athens seems to have been admirably governed; the war was regularly prosecuted, and the government was in the hands of the hoplite class.<sup>2</sup>

Theramenes had now been a leader in overthrowing extreme democracy, when Thucydides characterizes him as a man of great eloquence, ability, and sagacity; and also a leader in overthrowing extreme oligarchy, when Thucydides testifies that his political object was exactly the same as before, and that the attainment of that object gave Athens the best government she had ever had. To be a moderate oligarch and then a moderate democrat meant, in his case, no change of political principles at all. The change was in others. The extreme oligarchs had abandoned him, and the extreme democrats had come over to him on his unchanging platform of limited property qualification, in the old Solonian fashion, for participation in the government. And yet there was just enough apparent shift of position by him to make some comic poet's epithet of "cothurnus"<sup>3</sup> a telling and popular hit. Xenophon puts into the mouth of Theramenes<sup>4</sup> a capital rejoinder to the thrust made by Critias with this epithet, and it doubtless amused Theramenes himself and his best friends. The modern defender of Theramenes also may enjoy it as a fine political joke. He has only to remember what it was, according to Thucydides,<sup>5</sup> that brought the people over to

<sup>1</sup> *Scholia Arist. Frogs*, 541: ὁ Θουκυδίδης δὲ αὐτὸν ἐπαινεῖ.

<sup>2</sup> *Ath. Pol.*, 33.

<sup>3</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, ii. 3, § 31.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, ii. 3, § 47.

<sup>5</sup> viii. 90-97.

the platform of Theramenes, and so ranged him with the moderate democrats. It was nothing more nor less than a deliberate attempt on the part of the extreme oligarchs, who could not brook the restoration of Alcibiades, to betray Athens with its harbor into the hands of Sparta. "The charge was not a mere calumny", says Thucydides,<sup>1</sup> in telling how Theramenes ever insisted that treachery was on foot, "but something of the sort was actually being done by the accused . . . at any rate they would not see democracy restored, and themselves fall the first victims, but would rather bring in the enemy and come to terms with him, not caring if thereby the city lost walls and ships and everything else, provided that they could save their own lives".

It was for this attempted treachery, and not merely for his oligarchical convictions, that Antiphon, the haughty and irreconcilable aristocrat, to whose ability Thucydides pays so striking a tribute,<sup>2</sup> was legally tried and put to death. This was on the motion of the former oligarch Andron, as the document cited in the *Life of Antiphon* ascribed to Plutarch shows.<sup>3</sup> That Theramenes furthered or even favored the condemnation to death of his old leader cannot be believed on the insinuation of Lysias alone,<sup>4</sup> and in the absence of further evidence. Xenophon puts no such specific charge in the mouth of Critias<sup>5</sup> when he had every rhetorical temptation to do so. It was the misfortune, not the fault, of Theramenes that former colleagues of his in the oligarchy of the Four Hundred fell victims to their own high treason. He may have acquiesced in their death, but he can no more be charged with it than Washington can be held responsible for the fate of Benedict Arnold. It will be more difficult, though not impossible, to defend him from the charge of causing the death of the six generals in command at the Arginusæ; but in the case of Antiphon, on any rational interpretation of the evidence before us, his hands are clean.

It is with the reputation of Theramenes for tergiversation and treachery toward his commanders at the Arginusæ that the gibes in the *Frogs*<sup>6</sup> of Aristophanes have more especially to do. Of the part taken by him in the deposition of the Four Hundred, Ephorus (as represented by Diodorus) speaks only in the most eulogistic terms,<sup>7</sup> calling him a man of exemplary life and surpassing wisdom. The

<sup>1</sup> viii. 91, § 3.

<sup>2</sup> viii. 68, §§ 1, 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Lives of the Ten Orators*.

<sup>4</sup> *Contra Eratosthenem*, 67.

<sup>5</sup> *Hellenica*, ii. 3, § 31.

<sup>6</sup> vv. 541, 967-970, discussed below in III.

<sup>7</sup> xiii. 38.



phrases bearing on the issue which have survived in the compilation of Justin<sup>1</sup> emphasize only the acquiescence of the democracy in the establishment of the oligarchy at the outset, and the attempt of the extreme oligarchs to betray the city into the power of Sparta.

## II. *The Restoration of Athenian Supremacy in the Ægean Sea.*<sup>2</sup>

The evidence which bears on the career of Theramenes during these years is indirect, and therefore all the more trustworthy. It shows him—not to go into unnecessary detail<sup>3</sup>—cordially uniting with the people in assigning the leading command to Alcibiades and giving him permission to return to the city when he chose, although he must have felt toward this brilliant, erratic, and unprincipled man very much as Aristophanes makes Æschylus feel in the *Frogs*<sup>4</sup>: “Better not to rear a lion in the city; but when once you’ve reared him, consult his moods”. It shows him also coöperating loyally with Thrasybulus, that other champion of a restricted democracy, in various subordinate services on sea and land under Alcibiades as commander-in-chief, the three working together in perfect harmony, and winning together in 410 B. C. that glorious victory at Cyzicus which annihilated the Spartan fleet and brought once more from their despairing enemy advantageous offers of peace.

But it brought also, as great victories had repeatedly done before, a foolish over-confidence at Athens, and a triumphant restoration of the old socialistic democracy under Cleophon. This demagogue outdoes his prototype, Cleon, in rejecting an advantageous peace so honorably won, and in not only restoring payment from the state revenues for political services in the city, but in introducing a daily distribution of public moneys to all citizens not salaried already—the much-discussed but now clearly understood institution of the “diobelia”.<sup>5</sup> Still further to aid the starving laboring classes cooped up in the city by the war, the construction of a new temple of Athena on the Acropolis, the Erechtheum, was resumed at state expense.<sup>6</sup> Thus the socialists in the city, who insisted on a continuance of the war, were consuming the revenues which the war made smaller and smaller.

Much more efficacious in averting hunger from the pent up

<sup>1</sup> v. 3.

<sup>2</sup> The ancient authorities for the events of the years 411–407 B. C. are Thucydides, viii. 98–109, breaking off abruptly with the closing days of 411; Xenophon, *Hellenica*, i. 1–6 *passim*; Diodorus (Ephorus), xiii. 38–74 *passim*; Justin, v. 4, 5; and Nepos, *Alcibiades*, v.–ix.

<sup>3</sup> The scattered *indicia* are fully exploited in the monograph of Pöhlig, 254–265.

<sup>4</sup> vv. 1431 ff.

<sup>5</sup> *Corpus Inscriptionum Atticarum*, I. 188, 189 a; Dittenberger, *Sylloge*,<sup>2</sup> 51; with the interpretations of Wilamowitz, Meyer, and Bury.

<sup>6</sup> Bury, *History of Greece*, 498, *ed. min.*; Meyer, *Geschichte des Alterthums*, iv. 613 ff.

population of Athens was the restoration of Athenian control over the Euxine in the capture of Chalcedon and Byzantium by the invincible three—Alcibiades, Thrasybulus, and Theramenes, after a long and arduous campaign.<sup>1</sup> And it should not pass unnoticed that during the years 410–409, after all the political principles for which he had so patiently and successfully struggled had been abandoned, and after the peace which he favored had been rejected, Theramenes remained in loyal and successful service with Thrasybulus under Alcibiades. During the years 408 and 407—years which saw the triumphant return of Alcibiades to Athens, his defeat by Lysander, and his consequent rejection by the Athenian people, with what seemed an inevitable loss again of Athenian naval supremacy in the Ægean—we have no testimony whatever to the special activity of Theramenes, and are left to conjecture his feelings when to the abandonment of what he believed to be the only saving political principles was added the fitful deposition of the only leader who could reasonably be expected to cope successfully with Lysander and his colleague Cyrus. And yet that he did not sulk in his tent is clear from the fact that with Thrasybulus, the sharer in his political principles and in his faith in Alcibiades, he served as trierarch of his own ship in the battle of the Arginusæ, under generals who, with one exception, belonged to the radical wing of the new democracy.

III. *The Battle of the Arginusæ (406 B. C.).*<sup>2</sup> Thrasybulus and Theramenes, the partners and able supporters of Alcibiades in winning back for Athens the control of the Ægean and Euxine seas, served as simple trierarchs in the great battle off the Arginusæ islands. The Athenian fleet, with Conon pent up at Mitylene, where Arcestratus had died, was under the command of eight generals, of whom only Thrasyllus had any preëminence as a naval commander. In numbers it surpassed the Spartan fleet under its single and brave commander, Callicratidas; but in sailing and manœuvring qualities it was inferior. The battle was long and hotly contested, at first by squadrons, then by scattered and single ships.<sup>3</sup> In view of the large number of ships engaged on both sides (at least 290 in all), and the desultory character of the last part of the long struggle, when the end finally came with the death of Callicratidas and the rout of the Spartan left wing, great spaces of water must have been covered by the disabled, flying, or pursu-

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus, xiii. 66.

<sup>2</sup> The ancient authorities here are Xenophon, *Hellenica*, i. 6–7; Diodorus (Ephorus), xiii. 97–103, § 2; Aristophanes, *Frogs*, vv. 541, 967–970, with the scholia; Aristotle. *Ath. Pol.*, 34, § 1; and Lysias, *contra Eratos.*, 36.

<sup>3</sup> Xenophon, i. 6, § 33.

ing vessels. The Lacedæmonian ships fled southward with favoring wind,<sup>1</sup> while those of the Athenian vessels that could do so—and many must have been seriously crippled besides the twenty-five actually lost—put back, against the wind which favored the Lacedæmonian fugitives, to their former station off the Arginusæ islands, as Xenophon expressly says.<sup>2</sup> Considering the extempore nature of a large part of the Athenian outfits, the long and desperate character of the battle in which they had been engaged, and the manifest absence of any one vigorously directing mind, even this return to their original position must have consumed considerable time. Arrived there, according to Xenophon—and his is the best account we have, they would seem to have held a muster and ascertained their losses.<sup>3</sup> More time was, of course, consumed in this way. Then a council of war was held.<sup>4</sup>

Diomedon moved that all the ships put out in column for the rescue of the disabled vessels and their crews; Erasinides moved that all proceed with the utmost speed against the hostile fleet blockading Conon at Mitylene; Thrasyllus urged that both objects might be accomplished if they left part of their fleet there and sent the other part against the enemy at Mitylene. This last proposal was adopted, and then, since the work of rescuing the disabled vessels and crews was evidently unwelcome drudgery in comparison with the more exciting and glory-promising relief of Conon, the make-up of the squadron of rescue was elaborately determined as follows: from each of the eight generals' divisions, three ships; then the ten ships of the taxiarchs which had fought in the center of the line<sup>5</sup>; then the ten ships of the Samians and the three of the nauarchs which had also fought in the center, making forty-seven in all, or about four, as Xenophon is careful to have Euryptolemus point out,<sup>6</sup> for each of the twelve disabled ships still afloat in the offing, whether the number was accurately known at the time or not. But not one of the eight generals assumed the command of, or took any share personally in this attempt at rescue. The trierarchs Thrasybulus and Theramenes, together with certain taxiarchs, were deputed to conduct the rescuing fleet,<sup>7</sup> to which each general had contributed, as though to leave no rival any greater chance for glory at Mitylene than himself, exactly three ships. The rest of the fleet under the eight generals was to set out for Mitylene and the inferior enemy there.<sup>8</sup>

It is easy to see that (1) in the return after the battle, against

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, i. 6, § 37.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, i. 6, § 34.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, i. 6, § 29.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, i. 7, § 31.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, i. 6, § 33, and 7, § 29.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, i. 6, § 35, and 7, § 29.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, i. 7, § 30.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

the wind, to the station at the Arginusæ, and (2) in the muster and council of war, and (3) in the assembling of so complicated a constituency as the fleet of rescue, much precious time was lost. During this time a messenger boat had carried tidings of the battle to the Spartan commander at Mitylēne, Eteonicus; he had planned and executed the shrewd trick by which the tidings of Spartan defeat was converted, for his own forces and for Conon, into false tidings of Athenian defeat; he had then loaded his transports and sent them safely off under convoy of his triremes toward Chios, the rising wind favoring their swift passage past the spot where the Athenian generals were still deliberating.<sup>1</sup> The wind continued to increase in force, and at last, when the Athenians actually started to carry out the glorious and the inglorious project upon which it had taken them so long to agree, it was too stormy for either. They accordingly erected the customary trophy for their victory and bivouacked that night on shore.<sup>2</sup> The disabled vessels (at least twelve in number, as the defense of Eurypotemus admits), with the wounded or exhausted men still alive upon them, to say nothing of the dead, were left to their fate and disappeared.

The next morning, the wind having abated, the Athenian fleet effected its junction at Mitylene with that of Conon, who told them of the escape of the fleet which had been blockading him. Instead of instantly turning in pursuit to prevent if possible the concentration of the scattered fleets of the enemy, the Athenian fleet put in at Mitylene first, then sailed against their enemy at Chios, but accomplished nothing whatever there, and finally sailed away toward Samos.<sup>3</sup> A glorious victory, won by the prowess of individual ships of the fleet rather than by any tactics adopted and carried out by the generals in command, had been marred by two inexcusable failures on the part of those generals: the failure to rescue the surviving crews of the disabled vessels before the storm made such rescue impossible; and the failure to attack either of the two divisions of the enemy's fleet while separated from one another and disheartened by defeat. Considering that the Athenian fleet was manned to an unusual degree by actual Athenian citizens instead of mercenary sailors; that twenty-five ships with nearly all on board, or about five thousand men, had been lost, and half of the men needlessly; that nothing had been gained except the relief of the beleaguered Conon; and that the whole issue—the naval supremacy of the Ægean—was still to be fought over again, it is no wonder that the victory

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, i. 6, §§ 36, 37.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, § 35.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, § 38.

of Athens was thought to be "Cadmeian", even before the death of the culpable generals, though the famous dream of Thrasylus<sup>1</sup> depends for its rhetorical effect upon the subsequent tragedy.

The details of this subsequent tragedy are known to us mainly from the strangely incomplete story of Xenophon,<sup>2</sup> a writer whose oligarchical and Lacedæmonian sympathies are well known. His tendency is to make the conduct of the Athenian democracy seem as ridiculous as possible. His narrative, however, must be supplemented from the speech attacking the whole career of Theramenes which he puts into the mouth of Critias, and the *apologia pro sua vita* which he puts into the mouth of Theramenes in the dramatic scenes just preceding the latter's death, as well as from the numerous allusions to the conduct of Socrates in refusing to put an illegal motion to vote before the ecclesia, and from Diodorus (Ephorus).

In Xenophon's rhetorical *Agon*,<sup>3</sup> where the speeches are to be treated exactly like the speeches in Thucydides—*i. e.* as rhetorical embellishments of the historical narrative, studded with phrases that actually were, as well as with those which, in the opinion of the historian, might well have been used on this particular occasion—the charge of Critias which seems to sting Theramenes most, and to which he first replies, is this: "This is the man who, ordered by the generals to rescue the drowning Athenians in the sea-fight off Lesbos, did not rescue them, and then accused the generals of the neglect, and got them put to death in order to save his own life".<sup>4</sup> The burden of Theramenes's reply to this deadly charge is that in accusing the generals he was only acting in self-defense, since they accused him first of not carrying out the orders for rescue which had been given him. It was easy for him to convince the people that the storm rendered this impossible, since the generals admitted and even insisted that it was true.<sup>5</sup>

Why then were the generals put to death? For not having done what Theramenes convinced the people could not be done by reason of the storm? That would have been a cruel absurdity, to a belief in which the sophistical rhetoric which Xenophon puts into the mouth of Theramenes<sup>6</sup> need drive no one. "In urging in my defense", Xenophon makes Theramenes continue, "the fact that the storm made it impossible even to sail at all, to say nothing of res-

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus, xiii. 97, §§ 6 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Hellenica*, i. 7.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, ii. 3, §§ 24-49.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, § 32.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, i. 7, § 6.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, ii. 3, § 35. We need not suppose, as Pöhlig does (*loc. cit.*, 235), that Xenophon reproduces as nearly as he could a speech which he had himself heard, though this is not impossible.

cuing the [drowning] men, the city decided that I was within reason; but the generals were thought to inculcate themselves. They asserted over and over again that it was possible to save the men, and then abandoned them to destruction and sailed off”.

Now, whoever can believe that the Athenian people pardoned Theramenes for not executing the commission to rescue the sinking crews given him by the generals, because he convinced them that the storm rendered the service absolutely impossible, but put the generals to death because their charging Theramenes with delinquency in executing the commission proved that they thought the service possible, and this on the basis of a rhetorical embellishment in a writer known to be bitterly hostile to the Athenian democracy—with such a one there is no further arguing. But he who cannot believe the Athenian people guilty of such bloody casuistry has a right to reconstruct a version of the affair of the condemnation of the generals on the basis of the indirect testimonies of the rhetorical authorities, when they are not warping facts for the sake of their rhetoric.

The first despatches of the generals after the battle made no mention at all of the tardy commission of the squadron of rescue, but simply laid to the storm the failure to rescue the sinking crews.<sup>1</sup> After the fruitless return of the victorious fleet, however, to Samos, when private advices of the conduct of the generals during and after the battle off the Arginusæ had supplemented their official despatches, all the eight generals who had been in command were deposed, and summoned home for an accounting. Two new generals, Ademantus and Philocles, were sent out to act with the liberated Conon.<sup>2</sup> The fatal results of having too large a board of commanders for particular service were thus tacitly recognized. Two of the delinquent eight generals, foreseeing the tempest of wrath which awaited them at Athens, and conscious of fault, did not venture to return for an accounting, but went into voluntary exile; six returned. Erasinides was at once accused by Archedemus, the demagogue in charge of the proletariat's *diobelía*,<sup>3</sup> of pecuniary malfeasance in office, as well as of military misconduct. It was Erasinides, it will be remembered, who insisted, at the council of war, that the whole fleet should sail at once to Mitylene. The court remanded him for trial before the ecclesia.<sup>4</sup> The senate, after hearing the other five, remanded them also for trial before the ecclesia.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, i. 7, § 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, § 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, § 2, adopting Dindorf's *διωβελίας* for the impossible *διωκελίας* of the MSS.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, § 2.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, § 3.

It had become well known by this time what their line of defense was to be. They were going to bring forward in their own defense the dilatory council of war and its cumbrous and at last impossible scheme for rescuing the sinking crews. If any one was to be held responsible by the people for the wholly unnecessary loss of the lives of brave victors, it should be, they would urge, the trierarchs Thrasybulus and Theramenes, those friends of the discredited Alcibiades. At once these two powerful men with their powerful following were converted into bitter enemies.<sup>1</sup> It was easy for them to show that when their commission was finally given them to rescue the sinking crews, it was already too late, and that the lives of the brave victors were really lost in consequence of the criminal delay which the generals allowed to occur between the close of the battle and the council of war, of which delay the generals had said nothing in their official despatches. For that fatal delay the generals, and the generals alone, were responsible.

The Apaturia festival, which intervened between the first and the second ecclesia, when the senate had been directed to propose a mode of procedure in the trial of the generals, naturally served, and would have served even without the emphasis said by Xenophon to have been laid upon it by the powerful party of Thrasybulus and Theramenes, to increase the popular wrath at that fatal delay.<sup>2</sup> A member of one of the abandoned crews, who had almost miraculously escaped, brought the fearful message from his drowning comrades to the people that the generals had left the city's bravest men to perish.<sup>3</sup> Like a Paris commune the infuriated people swept all legal barriers and all the apologetic eloquence of Euryptolemus, which could only dwell after all on the tardy measures for relief taken by the generals after the fatal delay, alike aside, and hurried the guilty men, who had tried to roll the burden of their guilt upon innocent subordinates, to a common death which was certainly a most frightful travesty of justice. And yet justice was travestied, not in that innocent men were punished with death, but in that incompetent and cowardly men were punished beyond all just measure.

There is no evidence that Thrasybulus and Theramenes desired the death of the generals; they simply insisted that they, and they alone, should bear the blame for the first and fatal delays. And when the people afterward repented, not of having punished the generals, but of having punished them too hastily and severely, they wreaked their remorse on those who had incited them to the pun-

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus, xiii. 101, § 3.

<sup>2</sup> Xenophon, i. 7, §§ 7, 8.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, § 11.

ishment which was too hasty and severe,<sup>1</sup> and not at all on Thrasybulus and Theramenes, who remained, both of them, in high honor. And it is very noticeable that Lysias, in an oration the success of which depended upon his blackening the character of Theramenes, makes no mention whatever of his behavior toward the generals at the Arginusæ, and in speaking of the punishment of those generals because they alleged that a storm prevented them from rescuing the sinking crews, attributes it to the feeling of the Athenian people that it was their duty to avenge the valor of the dead upon their commanders.<sup>2</sup>

Again, as after the revolution of 411, it was the misfortune, not the fault of Theramenes that he was obliged to oppose those whom he had formerly served. The *Frogs* of Aristophanes, brought out in the spring following the death of the six generals, contains thrusts at Theramenes which have just enough point to them to be intensely humorous, after the manner of Old Athenian Comedy, but also just enough falsity in them to be genuinely tragical. "That's like the man of brains and wit and large experience that you are", sings the chorus in praise of the shifty Xanthias, "to roll over to the comfortable side of the boat every time, rather than to stand like a graven image of consistency; and this twisting and turning toward the softer spot is the mark of a clever man, and of a regular Theramenes".<sup>3</sup> And again, when Euripides claims Theramenes "the specious (ὁ κομψός)" as a specimen disciple, Dionysus cries: "Theramenes? a learned fellow, and powerful every way, who, if trouble comes, and he is right close by, makes the luckiest kind of a throw and escapes the trouble all right".<sup>4</sup> It was a nasty scrape, that affair of the neglected hulks off the Arginusæ, and Theramenes was closely involved, and he did get off scot free, while his superior officers perished. But that is all that is needed to point the shafts of satire. We may be sure the jests would not have been so delicate if Aristophanes had in his heart believed that Theramenes betrayed his generals to death in punishment for a sin of which he had been more guilty than they. Even Old Athenian Comedy would hardly toy thus with a red-handed and treacherous murderer. The same playful tone toward Theramenes is maintained also by the earlier scholia on these verses of the *Frogs*; the later scholia adopt the Lysianic tone, in spite of the fact, which they note with surprise, that "Thucydides praises him".

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, i. 7, § 35; Diodorus, xiii. 103, §§ 1, 2; Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.*, 34, § 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Contra Eratos.*, § 36.

<sup>3</sup> vv. 534-541.

<sup>4</sup> vv. 967-970.



IV. *The Establishment of the Thirty in Athens (404-403 B. C.).*<sup>1</sup>

With what are, for present purposes, unimportant differences in minor details, Xenophon, Diodorus (Ephorus), and Aristotle put a more or less eulogistic interpretation on the motives of Theramenes's participation in the events of this closing period of his life, and Lysias alone a malignantly hostile interpretation. The main events of the period are familiar, and there is little dispute about what Theramenes actually did, as in the matter of the death of the six generals, but diametrically opposite judgment of his motives in doing what he did. Here Lysias is the mouthpiece of the most radical democracy, which hated the conservative and mediating course of Theramenes almost if not quite as bitterly as it hated the extreme oligarchical procedure of a Critias, and quite as bitterly as Critias hated Theramenes. "Die Anhänger der *πάτριος πολιτεία*", says Wilamowitz-Möllendorff,<sup>2</sup> "waren von beiden Seiten angefeindet, aber sie haben in Wahrheit Athen gerettet; die Radicalen fürchteten sie ungleich mehr als die extremen Oligarchen".

When this young and brilliant man pronounced his oration against Eratosthenes, who had been one of the Thirty, he was inspired by two passionate desires: one to avenge the shameful murder of a beloved brother by order of the Thirty, the other to establish such a reputation for himself as would make the career of *λογογράφος*, which he had chosen for support in reduced circumstances, a lucrative one. A metic himself, he naturally reflected the sentiments of extreme democracy. But there were still more cogent reasons for the malignant attack on Theramenes which occupies so large a part (nearly one-fifth) of the speech against Eratosthenes. Like Theramenes, and following his lead, Eratosthenes had belonged to the moderate wing of the Thirty, but had been successfully terrorized, as Theramenes could not be, into acquiescence in the murderous excesses of the extreme oligarchs. The restricted democracy being now restored again by Thrasybulus, and Theramenes being naturally its idol—not only because a restricted democracy had been the constant aim of his political activity, but because he had given his life in an unavailing effort to secure it from Critias and the extremists, Lysias can only win his case against Eratosthenes by blackening the memory of Theramenes, behind whose popularity with the restored democracy Eratosthenes was evidently shielding himself. "Let no one fancy", Lysias says,<sup>3</sup> "that I am accusing Theramenes though Eratosthenes is the man on trial. I understand that Eratos-

<sup>1</sup> The ancient authorities here are Xenophon, *Hellenica*, ii. 2-3; Lysias, *contra Eratos.*, 68-80; *contra Agor.*, 8-46; Diodorus, xiv. 2-5; Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.*, 34-37.

<sup>2</sup> *Aristoteles und Athen*, II. 222.

<sup>3</sup> § 62.

thenes intends to defend himself with the plea that he was a friend of Theramenes and a partner in his achievements . . . that man who cheated the citizens into tearing down, to please Sparta, the walls which Themistocles built in spite of Sparta". Here Lysias subtly improves the telling rhetorical thrust made at Theramenes more than a year before, as we learn from Plutarch,<sup>1</sup> by a young orator named Cleomenes, to which at the time Theramenes had made the perfect reply: "Themistocles raised these walls for the safety of the citizens, and we pull them down for their safety; and if it is walls alone that make a city happy, then Sparta must be the most wretched of all cities, since she has none whatever".

By his long, patient, unenviable, and thankless labors as mediator between Sparta and Athens after the catastrophic defeat of the latter at Ægos Potami, Theramenes did actually save Athens from a far worse punishment than that which finally befell her, for there were many and powerful enemies of Athens who clamored for her utter extinction.<sup>2</sup> The resistance of Athens to Sparta after Lysander by sea and Agis by land had closed in upon her was as hopeless and useless as the resistance of the commune of Paris to the investiture of the Germans—far more so, since there were no provinces to which Athens could appeal for help. But this hopelessness and uselessness the socialistic democracy of Athens would not see till hunger opened their eyes, and then they had to accept less favorable terms than Theramenes could have secured for them before their exasperating delay. Then they were fain to lay their sufferings from famine at the door of the man who had saved them, and Lysias magnifies their cruel injustice, and fixes it forever in the brilliant rhetoric of his special pleading, even after that savior had sealed his devotion to the best interests of his city with his life. The fact that Eratosthenes as friend and follower of Theramenes could count on sympathy, "dient dem Redner [Lysias]", says Wilamowitz-Möllerndorff,<sup>3</sup> "nur zu dem vom wildesten Hasse eingegebenen und gröbste Lüge nicht scheuenden Angriffe auf den toten, von eben den Dreissig getöteten Theramenes".

Passing now over the malignant interpretations of the career of Theramenes down to the time of the Thirty, which Lysias goes on to give, since they have been already, in large part, considered, we come to the charge, inherently so damaging to the case of Lysias, that Theramenes took advantage of the high honor and esteem in which the people held him to come forward, when Sparta was un-

<sup>1</sup> *Lysander*, xiv.

<sup>2</sup> Xenophon, ii. 2, § 19.

<sup>3</sup> *Aristoteles und Athen*, ii. 222.

willing to grant terms of peace acceptable to the extreme democracy, and deceive the people into entrusting the terms of peace entirely to him, promising that he would make peace without giving of hostages, without demolition of walls, and without surrender of ships. Of what simple facts this charge is a gross perversion may be seen from the narrative of Xenophon,<sup>1</sup> which is certainly told in none too friendly a spirit toward Theramenes:

Such being the state of affairs [*i. e.*, a hunger-driven embassy to Agis, and from him toward Sparta with proposals contemptuously rejected by the Ephors on the border; then despair, fear of enslavement, of ravages by famine, and yet greater fear to propose acceptance of the Spartan demand for the demolition of part at least of the long walls, because it had been voted illegal], Theramenes proposed in ecclesia that if they would send him to Lysander, he would ascertain before he came back what the real intention of the Spartans was in insisting on a demolition of the walls — enslavement, or a guaranty of good faith.

But it is needless to follow in detail Lysias's interpretation of those acts of Theramenes which made him the Thiers of this vexatious and inglorious time. A sentence of George Saintsbury's on Thiers might, *mutatis mutandis*, be said of the successful conclusion of peace between Athens and Sparta by Theramenes: "After contesting the matter, on the one side with the determination of Germany to have the pound of flesh, on the other with the reluctance of the Assembly to submit to the knife, he succeeded in convincing the deputies that the peace was necessary".<sup>2</sup> The resemblance between Lysander and Bismarck makes the parallel all the more complete.

The same fact in Theramenes's career at this time is capable of diametrically opposite interpretations according to the friendly or hostile attitude of the judge. Theramenes did undoubtedly remain with Lysander nearly four months after he had gone from a starving city to see what his harsh terms of peace really meant. A defamer like Lysias says that his delay was intentional,<sup>3</sup> in order that the democracy might be starved into acceptance of the oligarchical terms which he, in collusion with Lysander, was eager to impose upon his city. A fervent modern apologist interprets the fact thus:

Das war ja nun offener Wahnsinn [*i. e.*, the refusal of the radical democracy under Cleophon to listen to any terms from Sparta involving demolition of the walls]; denn Athen hatte von keiner Seite Hilfe zu erwarten . . . jede Verlängerung des Widerstandes also konnte nur die Folge haben, die Forderungen der Sieger zu steigern. . . . Das abzuwenden, erbot sich Theramenes, als Gesandter zu Lysandros zu gehen, um den Versuch zu machen, bessere Bedingungen zu erwirken; er wusste

<sup>1</sup> ii. 2, § 16.

<sup>2</sup> *Encyclopædia Britannica*, art. Thiers.

<sup>3</sup> *Contra Agorat.*, § 11.

natürlich sehr wohl, dass er nichts erreichen würde, aber es galt, die Verhandlungen hinzuziehen bis das Volk zur Besinnung gekommen wäre.<sup>1</sup>

Theramenes himself said, according to Xenophon,<sup>2</sup> that Lysander had detained him all that time, and then had sent him back with the old message of Agis, that Athens must apply to the Ephors, not to him. It was Lysander, then, who was trying to starve the democracy of Athens into reason. There is absolutely no reason why the word of Theramenes should not be taken here.

Again, in the establishment of the Thirty in Athens, no doubt Theramenes worked in concert with Lysander, because he had to. Some concessions to a conqueror must always be made. But when Lysander had left the Thirty to themselves, Theramenes began to insist, as he had insisted during the oligarchy of the Four Hundred, six years before, that the political power be lodged in the hands of a limited body of citizens who were able to serve the state with arms and money. This was his constant ideal. When the ruthless proscriptions by the extreme oligarchs among the Thirty began to make their hold of power precarious, he boldly opposed the mercenary murders which his colleagues were setting on foot—such murders as that of Lysias's brother, Polemarchus—and urged that the list of three thousand citizens which the extremists had reluctantly drawn up be indefinitely enlarged. How Critias, fearing that his cruel sway would be overthrown by the more popular policy of Theramenes, coerced the cringing Senate into acquiescence in the execution of Theramenes as a traitor is a familiar story.

Lysias<sup>3</sup> would have agreed with Critias,<sup>4</sup> extreme democrat with extreme oligarch, that Theramenes was led by disappointment and jealousy to plot against his colleagues, as he had done at the time of the Four Hundred. But Xenophon puts a perfect defense in the mouth of Theramenes<sup>5</sup>: as long as the Thirty labored to establish a strong and good government, he was with them; but when they began to persecute good citizens, then he turned against them. And better still is Aristotle, in a passage from which, until the discovery of the *Constitution of Athens* in 1890, we had only a fragmentary and tantalizing citation in Plutarch's *Nicias*<sup>6</sup>:

The best conservative Athenian statesmen, after the ancients, would seem to have been Nicias, Thucydides (son of Melesias), and Theramenes. As regards Nicias and Thucydides, there is almost universal agreement that they were not only good and true men, but also statesmen who served the whole state with all the affection of a father toward a

<sup>1</sup> Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*, II. 106.

<sup>2</sup> ii. 2, § 17.

<sup>3</sup> *Contra Eratos*, § 78.

<sup>4</sup> Xenophon, ii. 3, § 28.

<sup>5</sup> ii. 3, § 38.

<sup>6</sup> C. ii.

child ; but as regards Theramenes, from the fact that political affairs in his time were so full of convulsion, there is some debate about the final estimate. To those, however, who pronounce no cursory opinion, he appears not to have destroyed all the forms of government under which he lived, as they slanderously say of him, but rather to have furthered them as long as they transgressed no law, with the feeling that he could serve his country under all forms of government — which is the sign of a good citizen ; as soon as they ran counter to the laws, he no longer gave them allegiance, but incurred their hate.<sup>1</sup>

It cannot rob these words of their convincing force to assign them to some oligarchic “ source ” from which Aristotle is drawing. Even in that case, Aristotle makes them his own by adoption, and gives them the great weight of his judicial opinion. It is the verdict of a great political student, whose political preferences were for a constitution midway between that of Pericles and that of Antiphon, in favor of a man who had consistently sought to establish such a constitution, only to be hated therefor by extreme democrats like Lysias, and extreme oligarchs like Critias.

It is needless to go into the separate details of this last effort of Theramenes to realize his constant ideal of a restricted democracy. According as the historian comes to their consideration with a favorable or an unfavorable estimate of the aims and motives of Theramenes hitherto, will he judge them in the Lysianic or the Aristotelian spirit. If he finds that in the first three great issues of his career Theramenes consistently followed a *via media* between the two extremes of political faction in the state ; that he devoted his great powers to the loyal service of the state in subordinate as well as commanding capacities ; that he was unfortunate but not culpable in the fact that twice he was obliged to see former comrades and colleagues suffer for conduct in which he had properly refused to keep them company, then the historian will estimate the motives which actuated him during the last great issue of his life—the establishment of peace between Athens and Sparta, in the Aristotelian spirit. Athens was inextricably in Sparta’s power, and starving at that ; while the two extremes of political faction differed from one another in their policy as far as unconditional surrender and no surrender at all. It was pity, the historian must say, not selfish ambition, which drove Theramenes to undertake personally negotiations for peace with a Sparta where Lysander’s word was law. He had to work with Lysander in order to bring anything to pass ; but it is gross injustice to attribute to him, as Lysias does, the motives which undoubtedly did actuate Lysander in what they jointly brought to pass. Here again the words which aptly describe the work of

<sup>1</sup> *Ath. Pol.*, 28, § 5.

Thiers in effecting a peace between France and Germany in 1871 are apposite:

Probably no statesman has ever had a more disgusting task ; and the fact that he discharged it to the satisfaction of a vast majority, even in a nation popularly reputed the vainest, the least ballasted with common sense, and the most ungrateful to public servants who are unsuccessful, is the strongest testimony to Thiers's merits.<sup>1</sup>

What the final word of Thucydides about Theramenes would have been, had he lived to write of the execution of the six generals and the establishment of the Thirty in Athens, can only be conjectured. But since he does not expressly condemn his motives in the deposition of the Four Hundred, and does praise the constitution which historians with perfect justice call the "Constitution of Theramenes" as the best which Athens ever had, we may be reasonably sure that he would have had only praise for him when he attempted to reëstablish that constitution in opposition to the cruelties of the extremists among the Thirty. Thucydides and Aristotle, then, in calm and dispassionate commendation of Theramenes's career, stand over against a wavering, uncertain Xenophon, and the rhetorical partizan of the Athenian commune, Lysias. Thus far the partizanship of Lysias disfigures too much the current modern estimates of Theramenes ; but the estimates of Thucydides and Aristotle must in the end prevail. No one holds that Theramenes was exempt from the faults so generally characterizing his day and generation ; he may have been, judging by modern standards, ambitious, cruel, sophistical. But judging by the standards of his time, he was free from treachery and chicanery, a sincere patriot, and, as Aristotle insists, a good citizen.

Erst die Nachwelt hat ihm Gerechtigkeit widerfahren lassen ; Aristoteles nennt ihn einen der drei besten Bürger, die Athen seit den Perserkriegen hervorgebracht habe, und ähnlich war das Urteil des ganzen späteren Altertums. Wir aber, die wir heute in demselben Kampfe stehen, gegen ein begehrlches Proletariat und ein ebenso begehrlches Junkertum, werden dem antiken Vorkämpfer unserer Sache unsere Sympathie nicht versagen.<sup>2</sup>

BERNADOTTE PERRIN.

<sup>1</sup> George Saintsbury in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, art. Thiers.

<sup>2</sup> Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*, II. 72-73.

With his artistic and impassioned *Gorgo, a Romance of Old Athens* (Boston, 1903), Professor Gaines, of St. Lawrence University, while naturally making many assumptions in favor of Theramenes for which there is no historical warrant, has admirably succeeded in that rehabilitation of Theramenes which this paper seeks to accomplish by the slower and duller art of the historian.

So Professor Morgan, of Harvard University, in the introduction and notes to the Eratosthenes in his *Eight Orations of Lysias* (Boston, 1895), shows himself fully in sympathy with the Aristotelian estimate of Theramenes.